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This paper examines the response of employment and wages in the US oil and gas
￿eld services industry to changes in the price of crude petroleum using a time series
of quarterly data spanning the period 1972-2002. I ￿nd that labor quickly reallocates
across sectors in response to price shocks but that substantial wage premia are nec-
essary to induce such reallocation. The timing of these premia is at odds with the
predictions of standard models￿ wage premia emerge quite slowly, peaking only as
labor adjustment ends and then slowly dissipating. After considering alternative ex-
planations, I argue that a dynamic market clearing model with sluggish movements
in industry wide labor demand is capable of rationalizing these ￿ndings. I proceed
to structurally estimate the parameters of the model by minimum distance and ￿nd
that simulated impulse responses match key features of the estimated dynamics. I
also provide auxiliary evidence corroborating the implied dynamics of some important
unobserved variables. I conclude with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of
the model and implications for future research.
￿I am deeply indebted to Chris House for sharing with me the art of formulating and solving dynamic
models. I would also like to thank Joe Altonji, John Bound, Charlie Brown, Matias Busso, Kerwin Charles,
Michael Elsby, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Ben Keys, Justin McCrary, Matthew Shapiro, Gary Solon, and Robert
Willis for useful comments and corrections. This paper bene￿tted greatly from the comments of seminar
participants at Harvard, MIT, Yale, Chicago, Princeton, Stanford, Boston University, Brown, Wharton,
Northwestern, Berkeley, San Diego, and Duke. All errors are my own.
11 Introduction
Perhaps the central tenet underlying the theory of competitive markets is the notion that
a freely traded commodity will command a single price. In the study of labor markets,
this assumption, the so-called ￿law of one price,￿ plays an important role in simplifying
theories of wage determination, allowing labor economists to abstract from the complex
sectoral composition of the economy. The law of one price is typically invoked under the
assumption that, in the long run, any sectoral disturbances leading to wage di⁄erentials
will eventually be arbitraged away by reallocation across sectors. In textbook models this
argument is represented by the assumption that the supply of labor to a sector is, in the
long run, in￿nitely elastic, which implies that any sector-speci￿c disturbances to supply and
demand will yield wage e⁄ects that are ultimately transitory.
A litany of policy implications follow from the standard model. For example, the incidence
of sector-speci￿c commodity taxes or tari⁄s should not, in the long run, fall upon labor in
that sector. Similarly, changes in the relative productivity of a sector should not permanently
a⁄ect a sector￿ s relative wages. In general, labor markets are thought su¢ ciently ￿ exible that,
given any disturbance, the welfare of workers in a sector will only be a⁄ected for as long as
it takes labor to ￿ ow across sectors and restore equilibrium. It is surprising then that little
attention has been devoted to determining how long this adjustment process takes, since, as
Keynes famously quipped, ￿in the long run we are all dead.￿ 1
The importance of understanding the dynamics governing labor market adjustment ex-
tends far beyond welfare economics to the core of many ￿elds of research in positive eco-
nomics. Much has been made of the supposition that shifts in the sectoral composition of
demand are capable of lowering aggregate output via costly reallocation of capital and la-
bor.2 In a series of in￿ uential papers, Hamilton (1983, 1988, 2003) has argued that major oil
shocks may have caused recessions through such a mechanism. Most of the empirical work
in this literature has focused on directly assessing the relationship between oil shocks and
output, rather than the links mediating this hypothesized relationship.3 The little existing
work that does examine the labor market response to oil shocks either ignores wages (Davis
and Haltiwanger, 2001) or relies upon relatively short panels incapable of identifying detailed
dynamic responses to shocks (Keane and Prasad, 1995).
1There is however an extensive literature examining the adjustment of local labor markets to shocks (Bartik,
1991; Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Topel, 1986).
2See, for example, Lilien (1983), Abraham and Katz (1986), Davis (1987), Brainard and Cutler (1993), and
Ramey and Shapiro (1997).
3Bresnahan and Ramey￿ s (1993) study of the U.S. automobile industry is a notable exception.
2This paper examines the dynamic response of wages and employment in the U.S. Oil
and Gas Field Services (OGFS) industry to changes in the price of crude petroleum using
quarterly data from 1972 to 2002.4 The oil industry provides an important case study for
a number of reasons. First, given the debate over the potential macroeconomic e⁄ects of
oil, it is of interest to examine the allocative e⁄ects of oil price changes on the industry to
which it is most directly tied. Second, OGFS is a non-unionized high-turnover industry,
requiring little formal training for production workers. In this sense, it approximates a
neoclassical spot market for labor. To the extent that important adjustment rigidities are
found in this market, they are likely to represent a lower bound on the sort of rigidities
found in more specialized labor markets with important training requirements and durable
employment relationships. Finally, the immense changes in the price of crude petroleum over
the time period in question provide ample exogenous variation in labor demand with which to
examine the performance of standard models of adjustment. The fact that oil prices are well
measured, volatile, and di¢ cult to forecast makes them ideal for investigating labor market
dynamics since they provide the rare opportunity to trace how well-de￿ned demand shocks
propogate throughout a labor market at high frequencies. If dynamic market clearing models
are to have any empirical content, they must be capable of explaining the basic stylized facts
uncovered in this analysis.
Using a simple econometric speci￿cation, I ￿nd that labor quickly reallocates across
sectors in response to price shocks, but that substantial wage premia are necessary to induce
such reallocation. Surprisingly, these wage premia emerge quite slowly, peaking only as labor
adjustment ends and then slowly dissipating. This pro￿le of wage e⁄ects is inconsistent with
traditional market clearing models which predict that wages should jump on news of a price
change only to be dissipated away by ￿ ows of workers into the sector. Indeed, traditional
models view wage premia as signals of market scarcity which serve to direct workers towards
one sector or another. But in this market, it appears that wage premia actually lag labor
￿ ows, seemingly calling into question the allocative role of market wages.
After considering and discarding stories involving contracting and composition bias, I
argue that a dynamic market clearing model with sluggish movements in industry-wide
labor demand is, in fact, capable of rationalizing the joint response of industry employment
and wages to oil price shocks. The key insight is that forward looking workers will use
information over and above current wages to make sectoral choice decisions. In such an
environment increases in the current price of oil will signal future increases in the demand
4Perhaps the closest analogue to this work is by Carrington (1996), who examines the response of the
Alaskan economy to the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline by a single ￿rm.
3for oil workers which may lead workers to ￿ ow into the sector in anticipation of future wage
premia thereby depressing current wages.5
To assess the quantitative plausibility of this story, I structurally estimate the parameters
of the model by minimum distance and ￿nd that reasonable parameter estimates yield sim-
ulated impulse responses that recreate key features of the estimated dynamics. I also show
that the model yields accurate predictions about the evolution of conventional measures of
labor market tightness in response to demand shocks.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, I provide the most credible evidence
to date on the dynamic e⁄ects of well-measured demand shocks on the equilibrium behavior
of a relatively homogeneous and competitive sectoral labor market of the sort described in
undergraduate textbooks. The analysis reveals that even in a very ￿ exible labor market the
long run is quite long (approximately seven years) suggesting that sectoral shocks may have
protracted e⁄ects on the welfare and decisionmaking of workers and ￿rms. I also document
that wage premia substantially lag employment adjustment at quarterly frequencies, a fact
one would have di¢ culty uncovering or believing without observable exogenous demand
shifters. Second, I build a formal dynamic general equilibrium model illustrating that market
clearing behavior is qualitatively consistent with the sort of dynamics uncovered in the
empirical work once one allows for forward looking behavior and adjustment rigidities in
labor demand. Finally, by structurally estimating the model, I show that the parameters
necessary to quantitatively match the dynamics are quite reasonable. I also show that these
parameter estimates yield accurate predictions about other moments not used to ￿t the
model.
The next section provides an overview of the Oil and Gas Field Services Industry. Section
3 describes the data used in the analysis, while Section 4 describes the reduced form empir-
ical results. Section 5 considers various explanations of the estimated dynamics. Section 6
lays out a dynamic market clearing model of sectoral reallocation. Section 7 describes struc-
tural estimation of the model and discusses the parameter estimates and simulated impulse
responses. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of the generalizability of the results and
implications for future work.
5This e⁄ect is similar to that discussed by Topel (1986) in his model of regional reallocation, though Topel
did not have dynamics on the labor demand side.
42 A Brief Overview of the U.S. Oil and Gas Field Ser-
vices Industry
The Oil and Gas Field Services industry (SIC 138) performs drilling, exploration, and main-
tenance services on a contract basis for large oil companies. Over the period 1968-2002, oil
and gas ￿eld services employed, on average, 65% of the production workers in the larger
oil and gas extraction industry (SIC 13).6 The main distinction in the industry is between
exploration and extraction. Using increasingly sophisticated methods, small crews of spe-
cialized workers search for geological formations likely to contain oil or gas. Upon discovery
of oil, an oil company will install a steel structure known as a derrick to support the drilling
equipment and dig for oil. If the site is o⁄ shore, the company will install a ￿ oating rig to
support the drilling operation.
The bulk of OGFS employment is in extraction. According to the 1992 Economic Census
drilling and maintenance activities account for approximately 90% of total production worker
employment in the industry. Tasks undertaken by maintenance crews (the largest group)
include excavating slush pits and cellars, building foundations at well locations, surveying
wells, running, cutting, and pulling casings tubes, cementing wells, shooting wells, perfo-
rating well casings, acidizing and chemically treating wells, and cleaning out, bailing, and
swabbing wells. These tasks involve some skill but are primarily manual in nature. Little
formal education is required and most training occurs on the job.
The industry employs a variety of occupations in many di⁄erent work environments.
While roustabouts and construction workers perform physical tasks in rugged outdoor en-
vironments, there are a number of executives and clerical workers whose work is performed
indoors. Geologists, petroleum engineers, and managers frequently split their time between
the o¢ ce and the ￿eld.
According to the 1999 Occupational Employment Statistics published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, ￿Construction and Extraction Occupations￿constitute the largest occupa-
tional group representing 41% of total OGFS employment. Among these workers the most
common occupation is the roustabout￿ a handyman who repairs equipment and performs
generalized physical tasks.7 Petroleum engineers, while common in the broader oil extrac-
tion industry, constitute less than 1% of employment in OGFS. Engineering occupations in
6Oil and gas ￿eld services encompasses the same tasks (e.g. drilling, exploration, and well maintenance) as
the general oil and gas extraction industry. The distinction is that the work in SIC 138 is done on a contract
basis usually for large oil companies.
7Roustabouts represent 10.4% of total employment in OGFS and a quarter of employment among the
Construction and Extraction Occupations which are likely to constitute the bulk of production workers.
5general are uncommon, making up less than 5% of total employment. Finally, ￿O¢ ce and
Administrative Support Occupations￿make up around 10% of total employment.
Employment in the U.S. oil industry is concentrated in a few states. In decreasing
order of importance they are: Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and California. Over the 1968-
2002 period approximately 40% of industry employment was in Texas. The industry is not
unionized. Only 4% of workers in the broader oil extraction industry report being union
members in the March Current Population Survey. The OGFS industry consists primarily
of small and medium size ￿rms. Most maintenance workers are employed in ￿rms with less
than 50 employees and most workers in the drilling subindustry work in ￿rms with less than
250 employees.
2.1 The Market for Oil and Gas
The U.S. oil and gas industries are regulated by state agencies, the most important of which
is the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC). Since 1919, the TRC has had the authority to set
allowable oil and gas production levels and to grant drilling rights. The mission of TRC￿ s Oil
and Gas Division is to ￿prevent waste of the state￿ s natural resources￿but its practical role
has been to stabilize the price of oil by adjusting supply in response to projected changes in
demand. Prior to 1972, allowable production levels were set such that the U.S. oil industry
operated substantially below capacity, ensuring a high but stable price. By April 1972,
demand outstripped supply and the industry began operating at full capacity, e⁄ectively
ending the rationing of oil. Also by this time net imports of oil and gas had risen to 27.6%
of total production signifying an important dependence on foreign oil supplies.
On October 17, 1973 the OPEC embargo was announced. With domestic suppliers
already operating at peak capacity prices rose dramatically. From this point on, international
￿ uctuations in supply and demand became the primary drivers of the price of oil and gas.8
While there is debate about whether the proximate causes of oil price shocks have been
geopolitical events or shifts in global demand,9 it seems clear that oil prices are not being
driven by idiosyncratic labor supply shocks to the U.S. oil industry. Accordingly, variation
in the price of crude oil provides an ideal opportunity to examine the response of a well
de￿ned industrial labor market to exogenous changes in output price and consequently labor
demand.
8See Hamilton (1985) for an excellent overview of the historical determinants of oil prices.
9See Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004) and Hamilton (2001).
63 Data
I measure employment and wages in the oil extraction industry using the Current Employ-
ment Survey (CES), which is a monthly survey of establishments conducted by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). The CES reports information on the total hours worked, average
weekly earnings, and average weekly hours of production workers as reported by employers.
The earnings concept includes overtime pay and bonuses while the hours variable includes
overtime and sick days. Average hourly wages are measured as average weekly earnings
divided by average weekly hours.10 The CES employment data are benchmarked annually to
the ES-202 series, which contains information on earnings and employment for all establish-
ments covered by unemployment insurance laws. The primary advantages of the CES data
over the ES-202 data are that they contain information on hours worked and are publicly
available over a longer period of time.11
Because oil shocks in￿ uence in￿ ation and other macroeconomic variables, it is useful to
focus on wages relative to the outside world rather than nominal wages. For this reason I
use the nonmetallic mining industry (SIC 14) as a control group in order to ￿lter out macro-
economic disturbances. Workers in nonmetallic mining perform tasks similar to oil workers,
have similar skills, and work in roughly comparable physical environments.12 Relative wages
are measured as the di⁄erence in log average hourly wages between the OGFS and nonmetal-
lic mining industries. Prior to the large disruptions in the price of oil beginning in 1972,
wages in OGFS and nonmetallic mining are nearly identical. Since wages re￿ ect the quality
of the workers employed in an industry, this ￿nding reinforces the notion that workers in
the two industries are comparable. There are no large shifts in employment in nonmetallic
mining during the sample period, and, because it employs similar workers, the nonmetallic
mining industry is likely to share much of the secular variation in labor supply conditions
experienced by the oil industry.
Monthly data on oil prices are from the Producer Price Index series for Crude Petro-
leum.13 This series corresponds closely to annual data from the Department of Energy on
the domestic ￿rst purchase price of crude oil. I de￿ ate the price data by the CPI-U since
10Note that this implicitly weights average wages by hours worked.
11The ES-202 series is publicly available back to 1975.
12Workers in this industry extract sand, stone, granite and other minerals from quarries. The tasks performed
by production workers are remarkably similar to those in OGFS as they involve drilling, transporting,
and processing raw materials. Unlike coal and metal mining, SIC 14 employment is not geographically
concentrated as most states have deposits of stone, clay, and sand. Employment is highest in California,
Texas, and Georgia. Like in the OGFS industry most workers are employed in medium and small ￿rms.
13BLS Commodity Series WPU0561
7￿rms should be interested in maximizing real pro￿ts. Because oil prices are not good indi-
cators of domestic demand during the period of regulation by the TRC, I start my analysis
with data from the ￿rst quarter of 1972. The analysis is conducted at quarterly frequencies.
I use the middle month of each quarter in constructing each series.
4 Empirical Dynamics
Figure 1 shows log employment and relative wages in the oil industry versus log oil prices.
The oil price series seems well approximated by a pure random walk. Dickey Fuller GLS
tests (Elliott et al., 1996) cannot reject the null that the series contains a unit root against
the alternative that it is mean stationary at the 10% level.14 Moreover, it is not possible
to reject the null that price changes are mean zero white noise.15 This implies that, to ￿rst
order, oil prices, at least at the quarterly frequencies examined, are a martingale, exhibiting
no forecastable short or medium run dynamics. Employment and wages also appear to
contain a unit root component, but they all have important short run dynamics as well.16
This di⁄erential property of the time series of oil prices is notable, for any theory purporting
to explain the dynamics of wages and employment as a function of oil price shocks must
generate short run dynamics on its own.
Clearly, the three series in Figure 1 track each other very closely.17 Note that employment
seems responsive both to price increases and decreases, suggesting that the oil industry is
able to end employment relationships fairly quickly.18 The relative wage series is roughly
centered around zero, as we would expect given a good measure of the outside wage, but
contains a noticeable downward trend which I correct for in the regressions to come. Like
the employment series, relative wages are strongly correlated with oil prices. Restricting
attention to the massive price buildup from 1972-1981 we see that employment increased
by approximately 370%, while relative wages (after detrending) increased by approximately
18%. Thus, if we were to interpret this behavior as representing shifts along a stable supply
curve, we would get a back-of-the-envelope elasticity of about 20.
14Unit root tests are conducted using the lag length selection procedure of Ng and Perron (2001).
15A portmanteau Q test using 40 lags has a p-value of .6. The lowest p-value across all lags between 1 and
40 is .094. The mean log price change over the sample period is on the order of 10￿7.
16DFGLS tests cannot reject the presence of a unit root against the alternative of trend stationarity at the
10% level for either variable, but portmanteau tests easily reject that the changes in the series are white
noise at the 1% level.
17The correlation between the employment and oil price variables is .78, while the correlation between relative
wages and oil prices is .6 after correcting for a linear trend.
18It could also be that many ￿rms go out of business during this period. I lack the data necessary to
distinguish between the two hypotheses.
8Though the ￿gures reveal an obvious long run relationship between log employment,
relative wages, and oil prices, it is of interest to investigate the dynamics of the relationship
between these variables more carefully. I consider simple distributed lag speci￿cations of the
form:19
yt = ￿ +
24 X
k=0
￿kpt￿k + ￿t + ￿qt + "t (1)
where yt denotes the outcome of interest (log employment, relative wages, or log hours), the
pt￿k are lags of log oil prices, t is a linear time trend, the ￿qt are quarter e⁄ects, and "t is
a serially correlated error term. Assuming that oil prices are exogenous, the ￿k coe¢ cients
give the e⁄ect of a 1 unit change in log oil prices k periods in the past. The speci￿cation
assumes that the adjustment process concludes after 6 years.20
In light of the aforementioned persistence of oil prices, it is more informative to estimate
the dynamic response of the yt￿ s to a permanent change in prices since that is the sort of
shock the oil industry seems to be faced with in practice. Denote the partial sum of the
distributed lag coe¢ cients by the symbol ￿k =
k P
j=0
￿j. The ￿k￿ s give the e⁄ect of a permanent
1 unit change in log oil prices after k periods. We can reparameterize the above equation to
estimate the ￿k￿ s directly:
yt = ￿ +
23 X
k=0
￿k￿pt￿k + ￿24pt￿24 + ￿t + ￿qt + "t (2)
Since oil prices are non-stationary and the error term is serially correlated, I estimate equa-
tion (2) in ￿rst di⁄erences and use Newey-West standard errors for inference.
Figure 2 plots the estimated ￿k￿ s for employment, relative wages, and hours along with
95% con￿dence intervals. The estimated instantaneous e⁄ect of a permanent 10% increase
in oil prices is a 1.5% increase in employment. This instantaneous e⁄ect is followed by
approximately four more quarters of employment increases after which time hiring slows
down and employment levels out at a new equilibrium approximately 7% higher than the
old steady state. Unlike employment, wages do not respond instantaneously to oil price
changes. In fact, the point estimate for the instantaneous e⁄ect of oil prices on wages is
negative. Wages grow slowly over the next six quarters, after which they plateau at a peak
of approximately 1% above steady state. They remain at this level for approximately two
19Appropriately parameterized vector autoregressive and autoregressive distributed lag speci￿cations yield
virtually identical results.
20The results are robust to the inclusion of additional terms.
9years and then slowly begin to fall back to parity with the outside world. Hours per worker
jump immediately by approximately 1% in response to price shocks and then slowly decline.
The estimates in Figure 2 are somewhat heavily parameterized. Figure 3 constrains the
￿k￿ s to lie on a 5th order polynomial. This reduces the standard errors somewhat and eases
visual interpretation of the results. The same pattern emerges. Wages move slowly, rising
only as hiring slows down and dissipating only some time after the industry labor market has
stopped growing. Hours jump immediately and remain high until employment adjustment
is complete. These regularities constitute the set of stylized facts that the next section seeks
to explain.
5 Discussion
The dynamics estimated thus far are puzzling for conventional models of wage determination.
Given that the marginal revenue product of workers moves instantaneously in response to
price changes, one would expect wages to also move instantaneously when labor is supplied
inelastically to the sector. These wage premia should dissipate slowly as workers arbitrage
wage di⁄erentials across sectors until the marginal revenue product of labor is equalized
across industries. Once employment adjustment is complete, wages should have returned
to steady state. The behavior is all the more puzzling given that hours respond to shocks
immediately and wage data should re￿ ect overtime payments.
Several alternative rationalizations of the facts seem possible. An obvious one is that
contracts prevent ￿rms from moving wages rapidly. However there is good reason to believe
that contracting is not the culprit in this industry. As mentioned previously, the industry is
not unionized. As Table 1 shows, monthly separation and accession rates in the oil and gas
￿eld services industry are both on the order of 10% in the years for which data is available.
Note that this rate is substantially higher than in the crude petroleum, natural gas, and
natural gas liquids industry which was also witnessing a dramatic expansion during this
time period. This is attributable to the di⁄erent skill and occupation composition of the two
industries. As their title suggests, roustabouts, the backbone of the oil and gas ￿eld services
industry, do not enter their profession in order to hold down stable jobs. With turnover
rates of this magnitude, formal contracting is likely to be costly and ine¢ cient. And though
workers and ￿rms would like to share risk, there is little chance for implicit contracts to
emerge in an environment where the employment relationship is so likely to be short.
One might still suspect that ￿rms are unable to adjust wages in the short run for other
reasons, such as administrative costs. However, inspection of the raw time series of relative
10wages in Figure 1 indicates that wages often do adjust very quickly. For example, starting
in the ￿rst quarter of 1983, after employment had reached its peak, wages in the oil indus-
try began to plummet precipitously. Likewise wages were able to spike immediately after
the onset of the ￿rst OPEC crisis in the last quarter of 1973. Thus, wage rigidity of the
conventional sort does not seem to provide a satisfying explanation of the patterns in the
data.
Furthermore, data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages indicate that
the number of OGFS establishments increased by 250% between 1975 and 1980 and then
fell by a quarter over the next 5 years. If a substantial part of the changes in industry
employment involve the entry or exit of ￿rms (or even establishments), it seems unlikely
that contracts or administrative costs would be capable of preventing wages from adjusting.
Another explanation might involve composition bias. If lower quality workers are hired
in times of high demand this might depress the observed wage even though the real wage has
increased. There are two reasons to suspect this is not what is going on. First, this would
require very large short run hiring elasticities. Say for example that new hires are only half
as productive as experienced workers and that this is re￿ ected in their wages.21 Then we
can write mean observed wages as:
w = [s + 2(1 ￿ s)]w0
where w is the observed average wage, s is the share of workers that are new and w0 is the
wage of an inexperienced worker. Logarithmically di⁄erentiating this equation with respect
to oil prices yields:




where variables with a tilde above them are elasticities. Thus observed wage elasticities equal
real wage elasticities minus a component due to increases in the fraction of inexperienced
workers. The magnitude of this latter component is increasing in the fraction of workers
who are inexperienced. To ￿x things, say, in keeping with the data in Table 1, that s = :25
and e w0 = :5. Then in order for wages not to move e s would need to equal 3.5 ￿i.e. a 1%
increase in oil prices would need to result in a 3.5% increase in the employment share of
inexperienced workers.
To get a sense of the magnitude of this number, write s = I
T where I is the number of
inexperienced workers and T is the total number of workers. If we assume that no experienced
21This could be expected to occur if new workers require a period of on-the-job training.
11workers leave in times of hiring and that no inexperienced workers become experienced,22







The regression estimates indicated that a 10% increase in price yields an instantaneous 2%
increase in employment (e T = :2). Hence with s = :25 we would only expect e s = :6, far below
the level necessary to prevent wages from moving in this example.
Second, even if one thought that composition biases were large enough to prevent wages
from moving instantaneously, it would still be di¢ cult to rationalize the rest of the dynamics
found in the previous section. If hiring slows down rapidly and workers only require one
period of training then wages could rise slowly in subsequent periods as the fraction of new
workers fall. But why should wages remain high for several quarters after hiring has slowed
down and industry employment has reached a new steady state? By this time adjustment
should be complete and w0 should have returned to steady state, implying that, if anything,
we should expect composition biases to yield a w slightly below steady state after a period
of expansion.
5.1 A Forward Looking Alternative
Suppose that potential oil workers are aware of the statistical relationship between oil prices
and wages. In such a case workers may be willing to switch into the industry when oil prices
increase based upon expectations of future wage increases even if current wages do not move.
This shift in the sectoral labor supply curve could in turn put su¢ cient downward pressure
on wages to prevent them from rising in the immediate wake of an oil price increase.
Would such behavior constitute an equilibrium? In the absence of demand side frictions,
it would not, for in such a case wages must rise on impact if they are to rise at all. However,
if the adjustment of labor demand is sluggish, large preemptive shifts in labor supply may
temporarily outweigh the contemporaneous shift in labor demand keeping wages low despite
rapid rates of hiring. Such a case is shown in Figure 4. As adjustment continues, however,
the number of workers available to work in the industry is drawn down and demand begins
to outstrip supply over the medium run, leading wages to eventually rise. But such premia
cannot persist inde￿nitely. Because the outside world is large relative to the oil industry,
22Relaxing these assumptions will only reinforce the conclusion that composition bias is incapable of explain-
ing the results.
12long run labor supply to the sector is highly elastic. Thus, in the long run, any wage premia
will eventually be arbitraged away.
Two features of this story are worth pointing out here. First, the usual dichotomy between
supply and demand shifters has broken down. Innovations to oil prices shift the contem-
poraneous labor supply curve because they slowly shift the labor demand curve. Workers
need not be aware of the manner in which demand moves, only the resulting reduced form
statistical relationship between wages and prices.
Second, the belief by agents that oil price innovations will result in future wage premia
is part of why the premium is delayed. Were agents totally myopic or ignorant of the
relationship between oil prices and wages, the supply curve would not shift out on impact,
and wages would inevitably rise. Thus, the beliefs about delayed compensation are self-
con￿rming.
One naturally wonders whether such a story could be quantitatively plausible. How
large of a future premium would agents need to expect in order for wages not to move on
impact? How predictable would demand need to be? In the next section I lay out a dynamic
structural model of sectoral reallocation that can be used to help answer these questions.
6 An Equilibrium Model of Sectoral Reallocation
The previous section argued that the slow response of wages and quick response of employ-
ment in the oil industry to oil price shocks may be the result of rational forward looking
behavior on the part of workers and adjustment rigidities on the part of ￿rms. This section
formalizes a dynamic market clearing model of sectoral choice in the spirit of Lucas and
Prescott (1974) capable of recreating dynamics of the sort discussed previously.23
Workers can be in one of two sectors: the oil industry (O) or a nearby sector (N). Let
the symbols Lo
t and Ln
t represent the number of workers in a given period employed in the
oil industry and the ￿nearby￿sector respectively. We can think of the nearby sector as a
reduced form for search behavior. It is the number of workers considering entering the oil
industry in the next period. The size of this group will adjust based upon how attractive
sector O is at any given time relative to the rest of the economy.
23Other multi-sector labor market models in this tradition include Rogerson (1987), Chan (1996), and Phelan
and Trejos (2000).
136.1 Labor Supply
Workers have utility that is linear in wages and a random taste shock "s
t which varies across
sectors and over time. Migrating between sectors is costly with cost equal to the "distance"
(d) between sectors. Each period workers in the two sectors observe the price of oil (Pt),
their draw of the taste shocks ("o
it;"n







, and the current period￿ s wage in the oil industry (wo
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workers make migration decisions and work for the remainder of the period. The Bellman
equations for workers in sectors O and N are:
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t ) are the wages paid to workers in sectors O and N respectively and d is the
distance between sectors. For simplicity, I assume that wn
t is a constant wn representing the
￿ ow payo⁄ to search.24
The alternative speci￿c taste shocks ("o
it;"n
it) are meant to represent random ￿ uctuations
in the utility of employment in the two sectors.25 Examples include random beginnings or
ends of romantic relationships, shifts in tastes, the expiration of a lease or contract, or the
death or relocation of friends and relatives. De￿ne "s
it = ￿vs
it where ￿ is a scale parameter
re￿ ecting the variance of the underlying idiosyncratic shocks. I assume that the v
j
it are




t as the value to a worker starting in sector s of choosing to move to sector
S 2 fs;s0g in period t minus the sectoral taste shock "s
it+1 so that a generic worker￿ s Bellman
24Endogenizing wc
t so that it varies over time does not qualitatitively change the results.
25Permanent di⁄erences in mobility costs could easily be incorporated into this framework by introducing
heterogeneity across workers in the distances between sectors. Such additions are not necessary for my
purposes.
26A more realistic model would allow the taste shocks to be serially correlated or even to have di⁄erent
intercepts across workers. Both of these extensions would make the short run labor supply response of
workers to expected wage gaps dependent upon additional state variables capturing either the distribution
of initial conditions of workers or the distribution of permanent tastes across sectors. While interesting, these
extensions are di¢ cult to implement for they require keeping track of additional states. Moreover, they are
likely to be di¢ cult to distinguish from more basic labor supply parameters such as ￿ which characterize
the general sensitivity of migration decisions to expected wage di⁄erentials.

















Note that the e V
s;S
t do not contain an i subscript because the expected continuation values
are common across workers. Using the above notation we can ￿nd the probability in any
period that a worker switches sectors. A worker in, for example, sector N will choose to
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De￿ne a selection variable D
s;S
t = 1 if a worker moves from sector s to sector S in period
t. Then given our distributional assumptions on v it follows from standard results (e.g.


















Note that the current migration probabilities implicitly depend upon the equilibrium dis-
tribution of continuation values V o (￿t+1) and V n (￿t+1). Making use of the properties of
Extreme Value distributions documented in McFadden (2003) we can simplify the expression
for these values by means of iterated expectations, integrating out the component due to the























































where ￿ ￿ :5772 is Euler￿ s constant and Evt+1 denotes the expectation next period with






. Substituting the above expression into
















































Together, (3); (4), and (5) characterize the evolution of the migration probabilities ps;S
in response to beliefs about the future path of wages. These in turn map into aggregate








With expressions for the ￿ ow of workers between sectors O and N we turn now to the










t￿1 + mo;n ￿ mn;o + Ft
The term Ft represents net ￿ ows to sector N from the outside world. Were this economy
closed, so that Ft = 0, permanent wage premia would be necessary to sustain increases in
sector size. Indeed, it is easy to show that in a closed economy the larger sector must pay
a higher wage since in any period only half of the workers in the economy will prefer to be
employed in one sector or another based solely upon their taste shocks.
This is a rather undesirable property of a model of the market for oil workers for two
reasons. First, the empirical evidence illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 suggests that wages do
eventually asymptote back towards parity with the outside world after expansions. Second,
it is hard to believe a priori that large wage premia could persist inde￿nitely in a market
consisting of jobs with very low requirements for entry. Although tastes for employment
in a sector vary across individuals, the number of people capable of eventually working in
this industry is extremely large. As working in the oil industry becomes more lucrative, the
pro￿le of the sector will rise and the number of workers considering entering the sector will
grow. This will put downward pressure on the compensating di⁄erential required for any
given level of employment.
To model the feedback from wages to the visibility of a sector, I assume that net ￿ ows from
the outside world to sector N are proportional to the size of sector N and the proportional
16deviation of the oil wage wo
t from its steady state value w.27 I also allow for some sluggishness
in the response to represent lags in the di⁄usion of knowledge about market conditions. This
is formalized by the following autoregressive speci￿cation of ￿ ows:




t) ￿ ln(w)) (8)
The parameter k controls the rate at which additional searchers enter sector N in response
to increases in the oil wage, while ￿ controls how quickly ￿ ows into N ratchet up or down if
the wage premium remains ￿xed. As long as k is positive, the steady state value of wo
t will
have to equal w, for otherwise sector N would grow or shrink without bound.
To simplify matters, I choose w = wn so that wages are equal across sectors in steady
state.28 This choice makes the (nonstochastic) steady state particularly simple. Equality
of wages implies equality of sector values since V o and V n are merely symmetric nonlinear
functions of future wages in the two sectors. It is easy to see from (3) that V o = V n implies
that the migration probabilities po;n and pn;o must be equal, which in turn implies that the
sector sizes Lo and Ln must also be equal for otherwise the gross ￿ ows between sectors would
not be perfectly o⁄setting. Thus, the steady state of the labor market is perfectly symmetric
in all of the state variables.
Moreover, several variables exhibit steady states independent of the long run value of P.
Increases in P will yield larger sector sizes. But as long as steady state labor demand is
downward sloping, oil wages, and V o and V n along with them, will be independent of steady
state oil prices. Thus, in keeping with the static intuition of elastic long run labor supply, (8)
imposes a long run restriction that the impact of disturbances on oil wages will ultimately
be transitory.
6.2 Labor Demand
We turn now to specifying the demand side of the model. Firms are price takers on the
input market. Because in such an environment wages are determined only by industry-
wide demand, I will not attempt to model the microeconomic details of oil production nor
the attendant heterogeneity across ￿rms in productivity, resources, or stocks of labor and
27One could also allow the feedback to be proportional to V o
t or V n
t . These setups all yield essentially similar
results. Unsurprisingly, when F is made proportional to either continuation value higher values of ￿ are
necessary to explain the behavior found in the distributed lags, for these forward looking values jump on
news of a price shock.
28Put di⁄erently, I choose wo = wc and solve for V o and V n using equations (4) and (5). It follows directly
from the symmetry of these equations that for such a choice V o = V n = V .
17capital. The key idea for the current discussion is that sectoral labor demand should respond
sluggishly to shocks. This could be accomplished by means of capital adjustment costs,
employment adjustment costs, gross hiring costs, risk aversion, learning, or any other number
of familiar stories. In this paper I focus on employment adjustment costs because they are
simple to model and likely to be important in this industry.29
I use a standard representative ￿rm framework to capture the behavior of industry-wide
movements in the demand for oil production workers.30 The ￿rm produces output using a
production technology with quadratic labor adjustment costs.31 The pro￿t function is given
by










where ￿ is a parameter governing the cost of adjusting the size of the ￿rm￿ s workforce and
A is a scale parameter.
The ￿rst order condition for employment is
wt = PtAF


























0 (Lt) ￿ wt + ￿Et [￿t+1]
In words, the desired change in employment is proportional to the discounted stream of gross
marginal pro￿ts (￿t) expected to be earned by permanently increasing the size of the ￿rm￿ s
workforce.32 Without adjustment costs employment would be set so that ￿t always equals
zero. With adjustment costs ￿t only equals zero in steady state.
A parametric form for the production function remains to be chosen. The distributed
29In a previous version of this paper, I included capital in the production function and found qualitatively
similar results. Without time series data on capital adjustment, such additions add little to the empirical
work.
30While it is by now well recognized that the microeconomic details of the adjustment costs faced by ￿rms can
in￿ uence the aggregate dynamics of factor demand (Caballero et al. 1993, 1997) , the gains from modeling
such processes are likely to be small in this situation since the phenomenon in question is quite generally
applicable to sluggish demand shifts.
31Classic examples of the use of quadratic labor adjustment costs under rational expectations include Sargent
(1978) and Shapiro (1986).
32This representation of dynamic labor demand is similar to the q-theory representation of investment as
expounded in, for example, Hayashi (1982).
18lags in Figure 3 indicate a long run employment price elasticity of around .75. A suitable




Totally di⁄erentiating the above and imposing long run wage equalization yields a long




which for the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form F (L) = L￿ can be
shown to equal 1
1￿￿. Because this elasticity is bounded below by one for a > 0; it will not
do for this analysis. Instead, I use the following "isoelastic" generalization of a single input
Cobb Douglas function capable of exhibiting su¢ cient concavity to yield long run elasticities
below one:




where C is a positive constant and ￿ is allowed to vary over the entire real line.33 It is
straightforward to show that this function exhibits a long run elasticity of 1
1+￿ which will lie
below unity for ￿ > 0 and exceed it for ￿ < 0. The parameter C, which is necessary only to
ensure that output is positive at all employment levels, falls out of the ￿rst order conditions
for employment since the marginal product of labor is simply F 0 (L) = L￿(1+a).
6.3 Equilibrium
Having laid out the equations governing labor supply and demand we now attempt to char-
acterize the resulting equilibrium. The migration probabilities expressed in (3) make clear
that the ￿ ows between sectors are a function of both current and future wage premia. The
upper panel of Figure 5 illustrates gross ￿ ows into and out of the oil industry as a function of
the current oil wage conditional on beliefs about the future path of wages. Each ￿ ow curve
has a logistic shape re￿ ecting the functional form of the choice probabilities. The particular
shape and position of each curve depends upon the number of workers in the originating
sector, the distance between sectors, and the scale ￿ of the taste shocks. Flow curves from
large sectors will have shapes that appear to be stretched vertically, since small changes in
probability will yield large changes in ￿ ows. Similar e⁄ects will ensue if ￿ or d is small. In
the steady state, the two curves will be symmetric (because both sectors are the same size)
33By L￿ Hopital￿ s rule, as ￿ approaches zero, L
￿￿
￿ approaches -ln(L). Values of ￿ above zero are more concave
than a simple logarithm, while values below zero are less concave.
19and will cross at wage wn, at which point net ￿ ows will be zero.
In the wake of an oil price increase V o
t will rise relative to V c
t on expectations of future
changes in the oil wage. This will lead the in￿ ows curve to shift to the right and the out￿ ows
curve to shift to the left, thereby motivating large net ￿ ows into the oil sector equal to the
horizontal distance between the two curves at the going wage. This increase in the size of
sector O has important feedback e⁄ects on the system.
First, net in-migration will put downward pressure on wages as the marginal product
of labor is gradually reduced. Second, as sector O expands, the base population at risk of
emigrating from sector O increases, shifting the outmigration curve to the right. Finally, the
realized wage increases eventually cause sector N to grow thereby o⁄setting the e⁄ects on the
immigration curve of the decreases in wages. The new steady state equilibrium illustrated
in the bottom panel of Figure 5 has larger gross ￿ ows in both directions, larger sectoral
workforces, and wages equal to their original steady state level.
It is convenient to illustrate the dynamics of the equilibrium in terms of the behavior of
net ￿ ows ￿Lo
t to the oil industry since we may also graphically represent demand in such
a space by means of equation (9). A key feature of this model is that the gross migration
curves and consequently Lo
t depend upon expectations of future changes in demand. If labor
demand were expected to increase in the future but for some reason had not yet shifted, we
would actually expect to see wages decrease in response to a price shock.34 Even if demand
did shift contemporaneously, if the future changes in demand were expected to result in
substantial wage premia, the supply curve might shift enough for wages to fall on impact.
Figure 6 illustrates such a case graphically. Here we graph the supply and demand for
net migration to the oil industry in wage quantity space. We start at the steady state where
wages are such that ￿Lo
t = 0 meaning that gross outmigration equals gross inmigration. Oil
prices increase raising the expected continuation value of being in sector O and causing both
the supply and demand curves to shift out to S￿and D￿ . This leads wages to fall very slightly
but results in large ￿ ows into the sector. As the sector grows, the demand for additional
hires falls and the demand curve shifts to the left. However, the supply curve of net migrants
also shifts to the left. This happens for two reasons. One is that the number of workers in
nearby sector N is drawn down causing the inmigration curve mn;o to shift leftward. Second,
as sector O grows, outmigration becomes more common since more workers are at risk of
emigrating. This serves to diminish net ￿ ows into the sector and consequently for demand
34Topel (1986) ￿nds an analogous result in his analysis of the migratory response to predictable changes in
local labor market conditions.
20to outstrip supply and for wages to rise. Labor demand continues to ratchet to the left as ￿t
is driven down by increases in Lo and the demand curve approaches its steady state. Labor
supply also continues to shift to the left as the temporary wage changes are realized leading
the expected continuation value of residence in sector O to fall. These shifts lead wages to
settle down to an equilibrium near their old level.
7 Structural Estimation
The key element of the model rationalizing the slow movement of wages is that workers
interpret oil price shocks as signals of future changes in the wage. Because of this oil prices
can, in the short run, motivate very large ￿ ows into the sector at a constant wage. Compet-
itive ￿rms delay paying such wages because adjustment costs lead aggregate labor demand
to shift out slowly. Once the wage premia emerge, they are driven back towards parity with
the outside world by increases in sector size. This section asks what sort of parameter values
are necessary to rationalize this behavior.
After specifying a stochastic process for oil prices, the equations in (3), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(9), and (10) collectively characterize the dynamic stochastic process generating the labor
market variables. To solve the system I use Dynare++ 1.3.5, which is a C++ routine for
numerically simulating Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models via pertur-
bation methods.35 Policy functions are obtained by calculating Taylor series approximations
to the decision rules implied by a series of dynamic stochastic ￿rst order conditions. Because
these approximations are made around a deterministic steady state I specify log oil prices
to be a near unit root so that a proper steady state can be said to exist.36 The speci￿cation
used is
ln(Pt) = :001￿ + :999ln(Pt￿1) + ￿t (11)
where ￿ = 3:91 is the log de￿ ated oil price in the ￿rst quarter of 1972. The simulations
assume that ￿ is a normally distributed i.i.d. shock with variance equal to 0.02, the empirical
variance of log oil price changes.
There are nine structural parameters in the system: ￿;wn;A;￿;￿;d;k;￿;￿. I calibrate
￿ = :95 and impose that steady state wages in the oil industry wn equal their 1972 value of
35For details see Juillard (1996) and Collard and Juillard (2001a, 2001b).
36In fact, it is hard to believe that oil prices, even in logarithms, follow a pure random walk. It is well
acknowledged that the best forecast for oil prices over the very long run is somewhere near the historical
mean of approximately 20 dollars a barrel.
21$8.86/hr. I also calibrate the production scale parameter A to guarantee that steady state
employment in the oil industry equals 99.6 thousand, its value in 1972, which is roughly the
modal size of the oil workforce experienced over the sample period.
This leaves six parameters (￿;￿;d;k;￿;￿) free to estimate. Taking a minimum distance
approach, I treat the distributed lag coe¢ cients from the previous regressions of relative
wages and employment on oil prices as moments to be matched to theoretical impulse re-
sponses (IRFs) to oil shocks generated by Dynare. Thus the relevant moment conditions are
of the form
E [g (￿)] = E
h












is the stacked 50x1 vector of distributed lag coe¢ cients estimated
from OLS equations of the form given in (2) subject to the additional constraint that the
e⁄ect of oil prices on wages dies out after six years.37 The vector ￿ (￿) contains the impulse
responses generated by the model with structural parameter vector ￿. I choose parameter
estimates b ￿ to minimize the quadratic form
Q(￿) = g (￿)
0 b V
￿1g (￿)
where b V is a 50x50 heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimate of
the covariance matrix of the reduced form distributed lag coe¢ cients.38
The simulated IRFs were generated by a ￿rst order approximation method. Higher order
methods yield nearly identical results. The parameters were transformed before conducting
the minimization process in order to make the minimization unconstrained. Four parameters:
￿;￿;d;and k were transformed into logarithms. A logit transform was used to map the values
of ￿ into the real line. The variance-covariance matrix of the transformed parameters was




, where G is the 50x6 numerical gradient of
the moment conditions with respect to the structural parameters. Standard errors for the
untransformed parameters were recovered via the Delta method.
7.1 Parameter Estimates
The estimated parameter values and standard errors for the model are shown below:
37This is implemented by di⁄erencing the ￿nal lag of pt in the wage equation.
38The HAC covariance estimates are computed using a Quadratic Spectral kernel on residuals pre-whitened



















2.51 0.55 0.16 0.98 0.26 0.93
(0.68) (0.22) (0.20) (0.27) (0.28) (0.22)
Standard errors in parentheses
Estimated Value 186.46
Minimum Distance Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors
c a s k d r 2 c
All of the parameters save for k and ￿ are estimated quite precisely. The chi-squared
goodness-of-￿t test which has only 44 degrees of freedom, easily rejects that the di⁄erences
between the simulated IRFs and the reduced form moments are due to chance. The primary
di¢ culties come from matching the near linear estimated ramp-up of employment and wages
in the immediate aftermath of an oil price shock. This behavior presents a challenge for
models of quadratic adjustment costs which naturally prefer geometric to linear employment
adjustment.
Turning now to the parameters, the fundamental metric of costs in this setup is quarterly
dollars per hour. For example, moving from sector N to O yields an estimated mobility cost
d equal to approximately $0.98/hr. in wages paid over the duration of a quarter or, roughly,
a week and a half￿ s worth of steady state earnings.39 The standard deviation of the taste
shocks can be shown to be ￿ p
6￿ and is also measured in quarterly dollars per hour. The
estimate of ￿ = :55 implies that the standard deviation of the transitory taste shocks is
equivalent to $0.71/hr. in quarterly wages or about a week￿ s worth of steady state earnings.
The adjustment cost parameter ￿ indicates the marginal cost to the ￿rm in quarterly
dollars per hour of expanding the workforce by 1,000 laborers. The estimated value of
￿ = 2:51 implies that the 1,000th worker hired costs the ￿rm $2.51/hr., equal to around a
fourth of that worker￿ s quarterly earnings in steady state. If the average worker works 45
hours a week and thirteen weeks a quarter this means the total dollar value of the adjustment
cost is 45 ￿ 13 ￿ 2:51 = $1468. The average per capita cost of hiring 1,000 workers is half
this amount at $653.
In keeping with equation (9), we can also think of ￿ as a mapping between discounted
gross marginal pro￿ts on labor and desired rates of increase in the oil labor force. A value
of ￿ = 1 would imply that a dollar per hour gross pro￿t on the marginal worker (with total
capitalized dollar value of 45 ￿ 13 = $585) motivates the representative ￿rm to expand the
workforce by 1,000 workers or approximately 1% near steady state over the next quarter.
39Steady state wages are $8.86. Assume 13 weeks in a quarter. 0:98=8:86 = 0:111 ￿ 1:5 ￿ 1
13.
23By contrast, the estimated value of ￿ indicates that a dollar per hour gross pro￿t would lead
the sector to demand only 1
2:51 ￿ 1000 ￿ 400 additional workers over the quarter.
The parameter ￿ is a measure of the concavity of the representative ￿rm￿ s production
function. Recall from earlier that the long run employment price elasticity of this production
technology is ￿l;p = 1
1+￿. Because the empirical value of ￿l;p ￿ :75 one would expect that
any attempt to match the long run behavior of the distributed lags would require ￿ ￿ 1=3.
The estimated value of ￿ is slightly less than this fraction at .26 which implies a long run
elasticity ￿l;p of approximately :8.
The parameters k and ￿ govern the rate at which workers ￿ ow into sector N in response to
expected wage premia in sector O. A value of k = :16 indicates that a one percent premium in
the oil wage motivates a contemporaneous .16% increase in the number of workers searching
for work in the oil industry. The estimates of ￿ indicate how sluggish the migratory responses
are with higher values indicating slower responses. The long run response to a permanent
one percent premium in the wage is ￿
1￿￿Ln so (conditional on ￿) higher values of ￿ also
indicate larger long run responses. The value of ￿ is estimated to be quite high indicating
some fairly substantial delay in the migratory response to oil shocks. We will see in impulse
responses that the delayed response of Ft to price shocks implied by these estimates allow
for the number of workers nearby to be driven down to the point where wages eventually
rise due to increases in market tightness (i.e. due to a scarcity of workers in sector N).
7.2 Impulse Responses
At least as interesting as the estimated parameters are the impulse responses they imply.
Figure 7 shows the simulated response of oil sector wages and employment to a permanent
price shock at the estimated parameter values along with two alternative paths implied by
negative perturbations of d and ￿ of two standard errors. The price innovation is one log
point in magnitude and the impulse responses are in logarithmic deviations from steady state
so they may be read as elasticities.
The minimum distance estimates match the behavior of the distributed lag coe¢ cients
illustrated in Figure 2 relatively well. Wages fall slightly on impact and then begin to rise,
peaking roughly two and a half years after the shock and then slowly declining. Employ-
ment jumps on impact and proceeds to ramp up rapidly towards its new steady state level.
Although wages peak somewhat later and at lower values than in the estimated distributed
lags, the largest discrepancy between the simulations and Figure 2 comes from the failure of
employment to actually converge to its new steady state over the simulation horizon. This
24occurs not because adjustment costs are prohibitively high, but rather because the eventual
decreases in the wage lead to small increases in the quantity of labor demanded by ￿rms.
To illustrate how the impulse response curves depend on the model parameters two
alternative IRFs are displayed: one with lower ￿rm adjustment costs (￿) and the other with
lower migration costs (d) on the part of workers. Lowering ￿ has relatively straightforward
e⁄ects, labor demand shifts out more swiftly leading oil employment to jump more on impact
and ramp up faster while wages are also driven up faster and to greater peaks. Lowering
worker migration costs (d) has more subtle e⁄ects. The employment response to the price
shock is essentially unchanged by decreases in migration costs, but the wage response di⁄ers.
Wages no longer fall on impact and now ratchet up to a lower peak that occurs earlier than
before. To understand this note that in the absence of migration costs workers would never
be willing to switch into the oil sector when there is a drop in current wages even if future
wages were expected to rise because they can always wait until wages actually do rise to
switch. But with migration costs, a worker with a high enough draw of the taste shocks
(vo
it ￿ vn
it) in a given period will be willing to switch into the oil industry and take a wage
cut in anticipation of future wage gains because the e⁄ective switching cost d ￿ ￿ (vo
it ￿ vn
it)
is temporarily low. Thus the migration costs d interact with the variance of the taste shocks
￿ to determine the degree to which workers are willing to substitute intertemporally.
As already discussed, net changes in sectoral employment are the sum of the gross migra-
tion ￿ ows between sectors. Figure 8 illustrates the response of gross ￿ ows between sectors O
and N to an oil shock. In all cases, ￿ ows into the sector jump on impact then ratchet down
as the number of workers in sector N is depleted. Eventually however, as ￿ ows from the
outside world to sector N ramp up, ￿ ows to sector O ramp up along with them and reach
a new larger steady state. The exact timing of this in￿ ection depends primarily upon the
parameters k and ￿ which govern how quickly sector N is drawn down and re￿lls. Gross ￿ ows
out of sector O, which can also be thought of as industry-wide separations, fall on impact
but then ratchet up as the sector grows.
Figure 9 shows the simulated behavior of some other key variables in the model. The
value of being in sector O jumps on news of the price shock and slowly intensi￿es as the
largest wage premia draw closer. As wages begin to dissipate so do the value functions of
which they are a forward moving average. The value of search V n
t also jumps on impact by
virtue of the option of switching to sector O and then decreases towards its previous steady
state. Net ￿ ows from the outside world fall very slightly on impact with the wage, but then
slowly ramp up in response to emergence of substantial wage premia. With more forward
25looking agents in the outside world, ￿ ows would actually ramp up in anticipation of those
premia.
7.3 Auxiliary Evidence
We have seen that a model of sectoral migrations with slow moving demand can recreate
the qualitative features of wages and employment we initially set out to explain. We ask
now whether any auxiliary evidence can be brought to bear on the mechanisms generating
the employment and wage dynamics in the model. Fluctuations in the wage are ultimately
driven by the dynamic scarcity of labor. Wages rise because at some point insu¢ ciently
many cheap workers are available. The structural model allows us to simulate the dynamics
of labor scarcity by examining the response of the size of sector N to shocks. When Ln
t is
below steady state, the labor market will be tight and it will be hard to attract large numbers
of workers without wage premia.
A key question then is whether Ln
t has any empirical analogue. The traditional measure of
market tightness is the unemployment rate. Since in this model sector N is meant to represent
some notion of the number of workers engaged in (directed) search, unemployment may not
be a bad proxy for Ln
t . I construct for use as a proxy the log di⁄erence40 in unemployment
rates between Texas and the entire U.S. from two sources: the Employment and Training
Administration￿ s insured unemployment rate, which is derived from state Unemployment
Insurance (UI) data available beginning in 1987, and the BLS Local Area Unemployment
Statistics (LAUS) series, which is based upon CPS data available starting in 1976. Both
series are seasonally adjusted. Since the UI data are not based upon a sample, and are
not smoothed over using a time series model, they are more likely to be able to accurately
capture some of the high frequency movements in state level unemployment that might be
disregarded as noise in the LAUS estimates.41 As with relative wages, log deviating the
unemployment rate in Texas from the national rate is meant to reduce the in￿ uence of any
macroeconomic disturbances on the analysis.
Figure 10 plots the simulated impulse responses of Ln
t under the various parameter
schemes against distributed lags of both measures of unemployment on oil prices. Given
that none of the parameters used in the simulations were estimated taking these distributed
40Logarithms are used to place the empirical distributed lags in the same units as the simulations which
show the behavior of ln(Ln
t ).
41The LAUS series uses a state-space smoother to distinguish signal from noise in the monthly state level
data. This smoothing may result in some of the high frequency variation in the signal being lost. See
http://www.bls.gov/lau/laumthd.htm.
26lags into account, the similarity between these plots is remarkable. All show a U shaped
impulse response with minimums between one and two years after the shock. While it is not
surprising that unemployment falls in Texas relative to the U.S. average when the price of
oil increases, there is no reason to suppose that the timing and magnitude of the response
would look like this. The resemblance between the UI coe¢ cients and the simulated IRFs
is especially striking. Not only is the turning point of the response similar, but both the
simulated and estimated IRF￿ s exhibit overshooting in the sense that the pool of unemployed
actually increases permanently after the shock.42
The general resemblance of relative unemployment in Texas to the simulated path of
the model￿ s unobservables neither con￿rms the assumptions underlying the model nor sug-
gests that unemployment is the primary element of market tightness. Many of the workers
considering entering the oil industry are probably employed in other sectors. Moreover, oil
shocks likely a⁄ect Texas unemployment through mechanisms over and above changes in the
demand for oil workers. What this exercise tells us however is that the dynamic relation-
ship between Texas labor market conditions and oil prices follows just the pattern necessary
to rationalize the empirical response of oil industry wages and employment to price shocks
through the model. This is a provocative ￿nding and one that should stimulate further
thinking on local labor market dynamics.
8 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the dynamics of a single sectoral labor market. The empirical
￿nding that, on average, wages lag employment in response to exogenous shocks to labor
demand is at odds with the predictions of conventional market clearing models. I have shown
that a forward looking model of sectoral reallocation with standard adjustment rigidities can
rationalize this behavior with sensible parameter values.
An obvious question is the extent to which such a model might generalize to other indus-
tries or environments. The recipe for equilibrium behavior of the sort under study is clear:
an industry should be subject to large and recurrent shocks to product demand, ￿rms in
the industry should face substantial adjustment rigidities, and there should exist a pool of
low cost workers capable of entering the industry in the short run. Whether large segments
of the U.S. economy meet these criteria is an open question. In manufacturing industries
42Similar results are obtained in the empirical distributed lags if one examines unemployment levels instead
of rates. This should be relatively unsurprising since the log di⁄erence in unemployment rates is the sum of
the di⁄erence in log unemployment levels and the di⁄erence in log labor forces. The latter quantity is very
slow moving and exhibits relatively little variation in response to oil shocks.
27other factors such as unionization are likely to complicate the wage setting process, while in
higher skilled industries such as engineering, lags in the training of workers are likely to add
additional dynamics to the labor supply decision.
Caveats aside, there is evidence of similar employment and wage dynamics in a few
important settings. The ￿rst is Carrington￿ s (1996) study of the building of the Alaskan
pipeline, which found a slow increase in the earnings of workers in construction and related
industries which eventually reverted to trend.43 Second, Blanchard and Katz (1992) ￿nd
hump shaped wage responses to seemingly permanent labor demand shocks in panels of U.S.
states. In both papers most of the employment adjustment seems to occur before wages
peak. Finally, in a closely related paper, Topel (1986) ￿nds evidence of state level wages
falling in response to predictable changes in local labor demand. The evidence in these
papers raises the possibility that labor market dynamics of the sort modeled here may be
found in settings far more general than the oil industry.
A few additional points are worth taking away from this exercise. First, the labor market
under study is extremely ￿ exible. Between 1978 and 1982 employment in oil and gas ￿eld
services doubled while over the next four years employment fell back to its 1978 level. These
adjustments highlight the ability of well functioning markets to e⁄ectively match workers to
jobs. However, a well functioning matching process does not imply that reallocations are
costless. The behavior of wages over the course of these dramatic shifts in labor demand
suggests that sectoral ￿ ows impose substantial costs on both workers and ￿rms. A researcher
armed with detailed longitudinal microdata might take seriously the task of estimating the
social costs associated with such high frequency intersector reallocations.44
Second, despite the ￿ exibility of the oil labor market, permanent demand shocks appear
to be associated with wage premia that persist for several years, even when the system is
begun in steady state. A series of persistent shocks such as those experienced by the oil
industry can keep wages out of steady state for decades at a time. To the extent that these
sorts of persistent expansions and contractions are present in other industries, an important
component of sectoral choice is likely to involve market conditions. More work is needed
linking standard models of sectoral choice with dynamic market models.45 Particularly
43See ￿gs. 3,7, 8 and especially ￿g. 9 in that paper.
44Lee and Wolpin (2006) provide a detailed analysis of the social costs of the long run reallocation of labor
between the service and manufacturing sectors.
45The literature on sectoral and occupational choice is too large to document here. Starting with Roy￿ s
original (1951) contribution there have been several notable attempts to estimate models of selection in
the labor market. Famous examples include Willis and Rosen (1979) and Heckman and Sedlacek (1985,
1990). One of the great challenges in linking selection models with dynamic market models is disentangling
28fertile ground for research may be found in developing countries heavily invested in exporting
commodities subject to large persistent price risks. Labor supply decisions in such countries
are likely to be fundamentally in￿ uenced by expectations and uncertainty regarding the
future path of commodity prices. Learning more about the dynamics of these decisions
and how they interact with individual heterogeneity may provide important insights for the
crafting of e⁄ective industrial and labor market policies.
Finally, the model presented here is applicable to labor markets de￿ned in spaces more
general than output sectors. A natural parallel is to local and regional labor markets. As
in Topel (1986), the analysis presented here has been one of spatial equilibrium. But unlike
with Topel￿ s model, the implication has been that the dynamic linkages between markets are
governed in part by the "distance" separating them. Thinking carefully about networks of
local labor markets that are (perhaps unequally) dynamically interrelated holds the promise
of revealing deeper insights into how labor markets adjust to shocks.
heterogeneity and dynamics. Recent advances in statistical modeling and data availability may soon yield
great progress in this area.
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  Date Total Hires Recalls Total Quits Layoffs
July 1978 9.6 7.7 0.7 8.0 5.9 0.2
September 1979 10.8 8.8 1.5 9.8 7.3 0.3
August 1980 10.8 9.0 1.3 10.7 8.8 0.3
May 1981 11.3 9.6 1.1 9.5 6.8 0.6
September 1981 10.6 9.7 0.7 10.4 7.5 0.3
Mean 10.62 8.96 1.06 9.68 7.26 0.34
Date Total Hires Recalls Total Quits Layoffs
July 1978 2.4 1.8 0.5 1.7 1.1 0.1
September 1979 2.6 1.9 0.4 2.5 1.3 0.2
August 1980 2.4 1.6 0.3 2.7 1.8 0.1
May 1981 4.0 3.4 0.4 1.5 1.1 0.1
September 1981 2.5 1.9 0.4 2.7 1.7 0.3
Mean 2.78 2.12 0.4 2.22 1.4 0.16
Date Total Hires Recalls Total Quits Layoffs
July 1978 4.1 3.6 0.4 3.2 2.2 0.4
September 1979 3.2 2.6 0.3 3.1 2.2 0.3
August 1980 2.6 1.8 0.7 4.2 1.8 1.5
May 1981 4.4 2.2 1.8 2.4 1.1 0.8
September 1981 2.1 1.5 0.5 2.7 1.4 0.7
Mean 3.28 2.34 0.74 3.12 1.74 0.74
Source: BLS Employment and Earnings
Oil and Gas Field Services
Nonmetallic Mining
Accession rates Separation rates
Accession rates Separation rates
Accession rates Separation rates
Crude Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids 
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Note: Relative wages are the log of the ratio of average production wages in the oil industry to average 
production wages in" "nonmetallic mining. Oil prices are deflated using the CPI-U series. 
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Figure 2: Estimated Response to a Permanent Unit Log Increase in Oil 
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Figure 3: Estimated Response to a Permanent Unit Log Increase in Oil 
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Figure 7: Simulated Response of Employment and Wages 
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Figure 8: Simulated Response of Gross Migrations 
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Figure 9: Simulated Response of Other Variables to a Permanent 
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Figure 10: Estimated/Simulated Response of Market Tightness  
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